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TIF in Illinois: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly
MICHAEL

T. PEDDLE

INTRODUCTION

Tax increment financing, TIF for short, is an economic development
tool whose use tends to evoke much debate and disagreement. "Since its
introduction in California in 1952, TIF has become one of the most widely
used economic development tools by municipalities across the nation,
including Illinois."' Since initial legislative authorization in 1977, over
three hundred TIF districts have been declared in Illinois, with nearly 60%
of these declared since 1987.2 TIF is particularly popular with municipal
policymakers and particularly unpopular with many other interests including
school districts and other non-municipal local governments. Both sides offer
compelling arguments to justify their positions, yet neither side in the TIF
debate ever seems to have a full set of facts or a broad-based community
perspective that extends beyond political jurisdictions or parochial interests.
While it is nearly impossible to expect anyone with an interest in public
policy to lack an opinion on the topic of TIFs, this paper is intended to
provide an even-handed discussion of the pros and cons of TIF as implemented in Illinois. Thus, even though one would be correct in arguing that
the conclusions of this paper indicate a clear opinion about TIF and its
future in Illinois, that opinion does not mask the opposing side of the
argument and represents one logical and reasonable means of summarizing
and interpreting the evidence.
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The first section of the paper discusses the basic components of TIF in
Illinois. Subsequent sections then address the positive and negative aspects
of TIF in Illinois. The final section of the paper utilizes the information
from our analysis of TIF to make suggestions for improvement of the TIF
law and process in Illinois. This section indicates that there are serious
problems with the TIF law and its implementation in Illinois, but that TIF
is a viable economic development tool that is worth preserving in a
somewhat altered and arguably purer form.
I. WHAT IS TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND How IS IT IMPLEMENTED
IN ILLINOIS?

A.

TAX INCREMENT CALCULATION

3

Tax increment financing is an economic development. Its premise is
that through undertaking a given economic development project, one can
expect that the property value of the project site and some amount of
contiguous property will be enhanced as a result of the project. According
to the Illinois statute: "[A redevelopment project area] shall include only
those contiguous parcels of real property and improvements thereon
substantially benefited by the proposed redevelopment project improvements.7A Therefore, a "tax increment" from these properties can be
expected. This tax increment represents the additional tax revenue from the
project site and contiguous properties, that is the result of the increase in
property value after the project, as compared with the property value prior
to the project.
An example might help make the concept clearer:
Equalized Assessed Valuation Pre-Project ............ 1,000,000
Equalized Assessed Valuation Post-Project ........... 2,500,000
Increase in Equalized Assessed Valuation
(Post-Project - Pre-Project) ...................... 1,500,000
If we assume a property tax rate of $10.00/$ 100.00 Equalized Assessed
Valuation (hereinafter EAV), then the additional property taxes attributable

3. See 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-8 (West 1996).
increment calculation.
4. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-4(a) (West 1996).

This statute formally describes the
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to the increase in EAV would be $150,000. This would be the property tax
increment for this project.'
Operationally, the pre-project property value is calculated and
certified. 5 This property value becomes the basis upon which the future tax
increments are calculated in the manner we just illustrated. It should be
noted that in Illinois and in many other states, tax increment financing can
be not only used with property taxes, but also under certain circumstances
with sales taxes. The tax increment calculation for sales taxes proceeds in
a similar fashion. A base, pre-project sales tax figure is established and
increments are calculated off of that base.
B.

TAX INCREMENT ALLOCATION

One of the most controversial aspects of TIF in Illinois and many other
states is traceable to the difference of a TIF district and the allocation of the
property tax increment after the declaration of a TIF district. Prior to the
declaration of the TIF, all of the taxing districts extending property taxes in
the area receive their full pro rata share of the property tax receipts based
upon their share of the aggregate tax rate/tax bill.
After the declaration and certification of the TIF, all taxing districts still
receive their full pro rata share of the portion of the property tax revenues
attributable to the pre-project certified EAV. The tax increment is captured
6
exclusively by the municipality for use in the TIF district. Thus, the tax
increment attributable to the property tax rates of the non-municipal local
government jurisdictions is diverted by TIF into a fund which is used by the
municipality to pay for the TIF development project or other ancillary
expenses in the TIE. Some of the broad range of purposes for which TIF
revenues can be spent include: staffing costs to implement and administer
the redevelopment plan; planning, architectural, engineering, legal, and other
services; training costs for the business employees within the redevelopment
area; property assembly costs and occupant relocation costs; site preparation
costs including demolition; rehabilitation of buildings and fixtures for lease
or resale; bond financing costs incurred by the municipality; interest costs
incurred by a redeveloper; and construction costs of public infrastructure
7
improvements and other capital costs. After the expiration of the TIF

5. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-9 (West 1996).
6. In Illinois, the tax increment can be captured for a period up to 23 years based
upon an approved redevelopment plan. 65 ILCS 511-74.4-3(n) (West 1996).
7. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-3(q) (West 1996).
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district, all tax revenues from the8 district are once again distributed on a pro
rata basis to local governments.
C.

THE GENERAL JUSTIFICATION FOR TIF

Depending upon who one talks to, one might hear a variety of reasons
justifying TIF. Unfortunately, many of the justifications offered merely
argue that TIF provides a flexible and powerful financing tool for municipalities undergoing fiscal stress. With the increased prevalence of property
tax caps, this cry has become louder and more fervent. However, TIF has
never been intended to be a general purpose economic development tool.
The intent of TIF is to allow a grant of power to municipalities to "use
the taxing power of other local government bodies to selectively target
blighted areas for redevelopment." 9 Under these conditions, the general
justification for TIF becomes relatively easy to buy into and understand.
Indeed, TIF is a powerful and necessary weapon for inclusion in the local
economic development arsenal. Having said that, I would argue that TIF is
the analogue of a nuclearweapon in the arsenal and should be treated with
appropriate respect and used with appropriate discretion.
TIF is built upon a fundamental foundation grounded in facilitating the
redevelopment of blighted property that would not be subject to private
sector investment in "but for" the intervention of government through a TIF
conditions1 °
district and its financing provisions. In such situations, blight
have made redevelopment of the subject property unattractive or infeasible,
such that private investment cannot be reasonably expected in the absence
of government intervention. Given the power and tremendous commitment
inherent in TIF financing, as well as the fact that very few if any areas
become blighted overnight, one would expect a pattern of private sector and
government efforts to redevelop the property prior to a decision to declare
a TIF district."1 A pattern of previous redevelopment efforts helps make
the "but for" case. Unfortunately, most statutes, including the Illinois
statute, are silent on the issue of the evidence that must be presented to

8. See 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-8 (West 1996).
9. Redfield, supra n.2, at 46.
10. In my opinion, blight conditions must be defined as characteristics of an area that
present barriers to redevelopment. In the Illinois statutes, blight conditions include such
things as age, obsolescence, depreciation of physical maintenance, dilapidation, deleterious

land use, and lack of community planning. Unfortunately, none of these terms are statutorily
defined or subject to definition in administrative regulations. Furthermore, linkage of the
blight conditions to redevelopment barriers has not been required by the courts.
11. The use of TIF as a last resort will be discussed infra Part IV.
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make the case for satisfaction of the "but for" test. This omission is
responsible for much of the debate over TIF.
Redevelopment of a blighted area that would not be subject to
investment "but for" the TIF district makes TIF in this circumstance easy
to justify from a public finance standpoint. On the cost side, the municipality is likely to incur the lion's share of infrastructure and public project
costs associated with the redevelopment plan. Once the project area is
redeveloped, all of the local governments will benefit from the increased
property tax base/revenues provided by the redeveloped project area. Thus,
the tax increment allocation from the non-municipal local governments to
the municipality, can be justified as a quid-pro-quo resulting in net gains to
all parties. If the area is truly blighted and would not redevelop in the
absence of TIF financing, the non-municipal local governments will not lose
any tax revenues under TIF that they would have otherwise expected to
receive. Furthermore, to the extent that the project has spillover benefits on
property values outside of the TIF district, the non-municipal governments
may come out ahead even during the time of the TIF allocation financing.
This is how and why TIF is supposed to work in its most basic and purest
in the Illinois statute is
form. The legislative finding and declaration
2
TIF.'
of
interpretation
this
with
consistent
D. OTHER MISCELLANEOUS (IMPORTANT?) INFORMATION ABOUT TIF IN
ILLINOIS

TIF districts in Illinois are a minimum of 1 acres of contiguous land
that qualifies as a statutorily defined blighted, conservation, or industrial
park conservation area that meets a three pronged test: 1) some level of
blight (varies by area); 2) has not been subject to growth and development
by private enterprise; and 3) no prospect for future growth "but for" the use
of TIF."3
"Local taxing bodies having territory within the proposed redevelopment area are required to be given notice of public hearings on the
formation of a TIF district, as is the Department of Commerce and
Community Affairs. Representatives of the municipality and other taxing
bodies are required to meet as an advisory board, but only the municipality
has power to create the district,determine the boundaries of the redevelopapprove the redevelopment plan, and set the maximum life of the
ment area,
14
district."

12. See 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-2 (c) (West 1996).
13. Redfield, supra n.2, at 12, and 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-3(p) (West 1996).
14. Redfield, supra n.2, at 11.
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The Industrial Jobs Recovery Act 15 recently expanded the use of TIF
to targeted areas that have lost substantial numbers of industrial jobs and
have brownfield sites in need of redevelopment.
II.

TIF IN ILLINOIS: TE GOOD

In talking about the good, the bad, and the ugly of the Illinois TIF
experience, I want to paint with as broad a brush as possible to avoid
unfairly singling out individual municipalities for praise or criticism. Some
of the examples used may be known to readers without my naming the
communities involved; please view these examples as generic and not
idiosyncratic or specific to the individuals or communities involved. With
this caveat in mind, let us turn to some of the good things about the Illinois
16
TIF experience.
Tax increment financing in Illinois can be praised for at least four
general reasons: 1) its power as a last resort economic development tool;
2) positive fiscal outcomes for fiscally stressed municipalities; 3) the
projects that have been funded through tax increment allocation financing;
and 4) alterations in the prevailing pattern of private sector investment.
Each of these reasons can be briefly explored in turn.
There are far more TIF districts in Illinois that I have not visited than
those that I have, it is safe to say that there are a large number of TIF
districts in Illinois with which I am familiar and that seem to have been
declared blighted in a manner consistent with the true spirit of TIF as a "but
for" redevelopment tool. These projects have turned around vacant
buildings, obsolete structures, brownfield sites, and decaying downtown
areas into vibrant centers of economic activity. 17 In the process, areas of
blight have been reduced or eliminated. With increased interest in transit
oriented development, in combination with the rail-oriented brownfield sites
in many inner-ring suburbs in the Chicago area, TIF clearly remains a
valuable and viable redevelopment tool that has a future in Illinois
communities.

15. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.6-1 et. seq. (West 1996).
16. What is good, bad, or ugly is certainly open to personal opinion. While I have

attempted to be even-handed and objective in discussing TIF, it is probable that my
classification system and assertionswill generate debate and disagreement. To the extent that

such debate and disagreement leads to better understanding of TIF and better TIF policy,
substantial progress will have been made.
17. Many other such projects have not been nearly as successful in creating new

economic activity and investment. Nevertheless, their declaration as TIF districts was

appropriate and offered a powerful tool for enticing reinvestment that would not otherwise
be available.
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Whether intended or not, TIF has also provided an economic develop-

ment financing tool to Illinois to municipalities that is relatively painless and

does not place additional fiscal stress on the often already stretched
municipal budgets. This makes municipal involvement in economic
development projects easier to justify and more politically palatable for local
officials to advocate. 18 Given the general difficulty in gaining public
support for government involvement in the economy, especially at the
seemingly complex level needed in economic development partnerships, the
availability of TIF has allowed many projects to come to fruition that
probably would have been otherwise doomed to failure.
Furthermore, whether TIF finance was appropriate or not in a given
project case, it is hard to argue that most projects financed by TIFs have
provided some benefit to at least to me segments of the communities within
which they were built. Indeed, in general it is probably fair to say that on
net, financing method aside, more persons probably benefit from most TIF
projects than lose from them. 19 Thus, TIF has provided financing for
projects that in many cases have improved quality of life for large numbers
of persons. For example, a rural community might have attracted its first
convenience or grocery store. A suburban community might have
refurbished a local theater and simultaneously provided a home for a
burgeoning community theater group and traveling fine arts productions. A
central city might have been able to build a parking facility that makes
downtown trips safer, more expedient, and more enjoyable.
Finally, TIF can be praised for offering a tool whereby local communities, consistent with their comprehensive plans, can offer incentives to alter
the pattern of economic activity. For example, the municipality might be
able to entice a new retail store to locate in a downtown area rather than in
a strip mall or greenfield site in a commercial strip. TIF allows some
equalization of the relative costs of developing greenfield and brownfield or
retrofit sites. Furthermore, TIF can be used to indirectly improve any
relative0 locational disadvantages between the greenfield and downtown
2
sites.
18. However, it should be noted that this argument is somewhat narrow in that
municipal, rather than local government, finance is at its core. As will be suggested infra
Part III, a broader view of the community's finances may not make TIF look quite as good.
19. It should be noted, however, that this does not necessarily mean that TIF finance
was the optimal means of paying for these projects.
20. Use of TIF to alter the pattern of economic activity is easily justified when the
major difference between the greenfield and brownfield sites is site preparation and

construction (i.e., there is no significant sacrifice in terms of expected sales and profitability).
As soon as differences in expected sales and profitability are introduced into the equation,
one must proceed carefully and try to assure some form of risk-sharing agreement that will
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TIF IN ILLINOIS: THE BAD

The bad in the TIF experience can be summed up relatively easily in
general terms: TIF in Illinois, due to the lack of administrative regulations,
lax state agency enforcement, lax judicial review and intervention (as well
as the high costs of litigation), perversion of the TIF declaration process by
for-profit consultants and business location officials, and municipal coconspirators, has become a general economic development tool available to
nearly any municipality and used with little or no discretion or oversight.
Each part of this lengthy assertion deserves some explanation and illumination.
Illinois, like most states but unlike the federal government, does not
generally produce legally binding administrative regulation 2' to assist in
interpreting and implementing state statutes. In the case of the various TIF
acts, including the seminal Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment
Act, 22 this has been frustrating at the very least. The primary areas of
contention regarding the statute would, not surprisingly, seem to be related
to qualifying an area as "blighted" and meeting the "but for" test.
The number of TIF districts that have been overturned for not meeting
the blighting condition and/or the "but for" test can be counted using fewer
fingers that those on one person's hand. While Redfield notes an increased
willingness to sue over applications of TIF, he goes on to say that, "until
recently, the courts have given the actions of municipal officials in
designating TIF districts a presumption of validity. There are no case law
standards at the State Supreme Court level setting out the limits of how
municipal officials can apply the statutory criteria, which are very broadly
drawn to begin with.",23 While Redfield asserts that there is no evidence
to indicate that the law is being "widely misused" in designating TIF
districts, he does note "the increased willingness of public officials to sue
indicates a growing concern over how the TIP law is being applied."24

benefit both the business and the community. Sales tax rebate agreements are often used for

this purpose.

21. It should be noted that the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community
Affairs has published a number of pamphlets on TIF and related issues that seem to offer

guidance in interpreting the TIF statute (e.g., one pamphlet provides definitions of the blight
factors cited in the statute). However, these pamphlets do not have the legal standing of
administrative regulations and as a result cannot be used to substantively defend or impeach
the methodology used to certify a given TIF district.
22. 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-1 et. seq. (West 1996).
23. Redfield, supranote 2, at 38.
24. Id.
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While clearly a matter of interpretation, I would take issue with
Redfield's assertion that there is no evidence of widespread misuse of TIF.
If one subscribes to the use of TIF in blighted areas that would not
develop/redevelop "but for" the use of TIF, I think one can find widespread
misuse of TIF. Having read and reviewed probably fifty TIF qualification
studies from a variety of communities and for a variety of types of project
areas, I have yet to see more than a perfunctory treatment of the blighting
factors and "but for" criterion. Perhaps more telling is testimony from a
major TIF consultant who could not recall a single occasion where he had
recommended against a TIF study for a given project area or made a
negative finding in a TIF qualification study. Given the opportunity to create
further business for themselves through doing a redevelopment plan or other
comprehensive planning services for the municipality, perhaps this pattern
of outcome should not be surprising. If not surprising, the failure to
objectively investigate blighting and redevelopment alternatives is counter
to the effective (and I believe intended) use of tax increment financing.
Unfortunately, these perfunctory TIF qualification studies have become the
norm and have been readily accepted by state review authorities. The
standard, and I have heard this arguement by municipal lawyers during
litigation, is that the municipality merely declare the area blighted, declare
the blight factors they claim, and assert the "but for" test is met; they
argue 25 nothing further is required or intended by statute. Blight and the
"but for" test are therefore met by the administrative flat of the municipality! It seems to be an incredible waste of legislature, legislative staff, and
editorial time, as well as precious resources for the paper to go to the
trouble of passing detailed economic development legislation that ultimately
hinges merely on the exercise of administrative flat. Further evidence of
this fiat power is provided through recall of the earlier point that nonmunicipal local governments only have an advisory role in challenging or
fighting TIF certification.
Unfortunately, in the absence of administrative regulations or serious
state-level review of TIF district certification, litigation and judicial review
appear to be the only feasible means of interpreting and challenging the
application of the TIF act. Such challenges are extremely expensive,
especially given the revenue generating ability, of a municipality that is
available to fight such a lawsuit. Furthermore, one who challenges a TIF
in defense of the public interest is caught in a Catch 22: litigating the case
forces the municipality to spend taxpayer dollars to defend a lawsuit
ultimately grounded in saving taxpayer dollars. It is not at all inconceivable

25. Review authorities, including the judiciary, have tended to uphold this view.
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that a successful plaintiff might end up winning the battle, but ultimately
losing the public interest war. Fortunately, some plaintiffs have enough
money and principle that they choose to go forward even in the face of the
overwhelming odds and downside risks.
In 1994, I served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in a TIF case.
The case did go to trial and the defendant municipality was successful in
defending its TIF district and redevelopment plan/project. While I respect
the court's decision in the case, the process and outcome nevertheless left
me even more disenchanted with some of the applications of TIF in Illinois
and more fodder for my arguments on the "bad" side of TIF.
One major point made in the trial by the defendants, and one that I
wholeheartedly agree with, is that the statute is silent on the time frame over
which development has failed to take place or the time frame over which
redevelopment/development cannot be reasonably expected to take place.
Furthermore, given that TIF can generally be expected to artificially increase
the rate of development or redevelopment, it is reasonable to conclude that
redevelopment with TIF will occur earlier than redevelopment without TIF.
Thus, we are left with an extremely important open question: How much
does TIF have to accelerate the pace of development or redevelopment in
order to meet a good faith "but for" test? Unfortunately, there is not
statutory or otherwise established objective standards for answering this
question. We will revisit this question in the TIF reform section.
Another issue raised at trial that left me disillusioned and dissatisfied
was related to the relationship between claimed blight factors and barriers
to redevelopment. I would argue that the TIF law makes sense only to the
extent that the blighting factors cited in the statute are shown to be barriers
to redevelopment. An easy example comes to mind: age of structures is a
blight factor in the statute. In the absence of consideration of the effect of
the age of structures on the prospects for development or redevelopment, the
citation of age as a blight factor is meaningless. Indeed, if one had an
economic development policy grounded in recreating a Dickens village with
bed-and-breakfast inns, age may be a positive rather than negative
development or redevelopment factor. Similarly, one would expect
deleterious land uses as an area makes economic transition. Unless the
deleterious land use is a barrier to redevelopment, I would argue that it is
not and should not be cited as a blight factor. Given that the statute is an
economic development statute containing a "but for" condition, I think this
interpretation of the blight factors is the only reasonable and appropriate
one. The judge in our case, at the beginning of the plaintiff's direct
examination of myself as a witness, sustained an objection on the part of the
defendants that would not allow me to make any judgment as to whether the
blight factors were a barrier to redevelopment, because the statute makes no
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explicit requirement that the blight factors in any way be related to the
redevelopment prospects of the project area. While this is technically
accurate, the statute and TIF as an economic development tool make little
or no sense given this interpretation.
Another major issue for me in the case was related to blight mitigation
efforts on the part of the municipality. In general, I believe it is bad public
policy to allow municipalities to fail to seek mitigation or amelioration of
blight conditions, and then turn around and designate a TIF district after
several years of allowing the area to deteriorate. For example, why should
a municipality be able to claim code violations as a blighting condition if
they have no history of attempting to enforce their code? Alternatively, the
defendant village in the lawsuit with which I was involved had an express
policy of not maintaining residential streets in the absence of a special
assessment district. To claim poor roads in the area as a blight factor seems
audacious at the least. To claim lack of community planning as a blight
factor and show no efforts to ameliorate this deficiency prior to declaring
a TIF district also does not seem right. Though I am not a lawyer, I do
understand the equity concept of "unclean hands" and would think there is
some application in the case of attempting or producing a history of
mitigating efforts before a declaration of blight can be registered.
The potential fiscal effects on other units of local government is
another bad result in TIF implementation in Illinois. This is a particularly
serious problem given Illinois' unparalleled number of local governments
(over 6600!).26 It should be noted that the negative fiscal effects on nonmunicipal governments becomes a major issue in cases where satisfaction
of the "but for" test is an issue or in cases where ancillary economic
development is induced by the redevelopment plan that occurs on fiscally
unfavorable terms to the non-municipal local governments. These two
categories of cases should be considered separately in the interests of not
confusing the very different arguments underlying their potentially negative
fiscal effects.

26. The objectives of governmental units tend to differ by their function. Furthermore,

the fiscal effects of different forms of development varies by the type of governmental unit
(e.g., many types of multi-family housing produce fiscal surpluses for municipalities at the
same time they produce fiscal deficits for school districts and other residentially based service
producers that are sensitive to population). Also, in Illinois, municipalities and counties are
generally the only units of local governments that share in sales tax revenues. This diversion
in fiscal outcomes can create significant conflict over the effects of economic development
decisions that are generally driven by the objective functions of general purpose governments
and imposed upon constituent special purpose governments.
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As already pointed out, the Illinois TIF experience has generally been
very lenient in terms of meeting the "but for" test. Furthermore, the statute
is silent on the time frame of analysis for consideration of economic
development prospects. However, from a theoretical standpoint, the
appropriate time frame of analysis for the "but for" testfrom theperspective
of non-municipal local governments is much less ambiguous. Any
reasonable expectation of development or redevelopment in a time period
shorter than the life of the TIF district will result in the TIF having negative
fiscal consequences on the non-municipal local governments. 27 However,
while these negative fiscal consequences are factual, this is not a prima facie
case against the corresponding TIF district. The benefits of the TIF,
including removal of blight and the benefits of the TIF project itself, must
be considered to determine the balance between social benefits and costs of
a given TIF district and project.
Even where the "but for" test is faithfully met, the TIF district can be
responsible for negative fiscal effects on the non-municipal local governments. While the situation is perhaps remote, especially in terms of the
probable magnitude of the negative fiscal effects in most situations, the
theoretical fact pattern is one that municipalities should be cognizant of in
undertaking economic development activity, with or without a TIE. The
general case scenario is one where a TIF project makes a community
substantially more attractive for residential development or growth. 28 This
residential growth or development can have adverse effects on those special
purpose governments responsible for producing population dependent
services (like primary and secondary education). The real point here is to
be sure to consider the indirect and secondary economic development effects
of the TIF district and their implications for all constituent units of local
government. The Illinois TIF law does not provide for more than advisory
input on the part of non-municipal local governments, 29 further exacerbating the problem of giving adequate consideration to the conflicting, often
unintended, effects on different types of local governments from economic
development projects including those funded through TIFs.
Some municipalities voluntarily rebate a portion of the tax increment
to the school district and other constituent governments for use in the TIF.
27. This assumes no sharing or rebate of the tax increment to non-municipal
governments. To the extent that there is pro rata sharing of the tax increment, the negative
fiscal consequences are reduced. It should be noted that, other things held constant, the
shorted the time horizon for expected economic development in the absence of the TIF the
more negative will be the fiscal consequences for non-municipal governments.
28. For example, the opening of a large industrial facility in a rural area.
29. See 65 ILCS 5/11-74.4-5(b) (West 1996).
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The major problem with this is that such funds are limited in their use to
those uses allowed by the TIF statute and therefore have allowed the
municipality to some extent dictate the planning priorities of non-municipal
governments.
IV.

TIF IN ILLINOIS: THE UGLY

In many ways, the ugly of the Illinois TIEF experience is its worst
indictment. The ugly of the Illinois TIF experience includes those uses of
the TIF as weapons in interregional and especially intraregional development
wars such that the net public economic gains are zero or negligible, with
significant public costs incurred under TIF financing. While technically TIF
is not intended to be used to finance relocation of firms from one jurisdiction to another, in point of fact TIF is often used in border wars that occur
over the location and relocation of finns. Overcoming the prohibition
against local relocation of a firm is actually fairly easy (and sleazy?) to do.
In the interests of not exacerbating the problem of using TIF for reallocation
of firms by explaining the methodology for circumventing the law, suffice
to say that through creative business organization tools, existing businesses
can be relocated and take advantage of even a sales tax TIF in Illinois.
To the extent that TIF is used as a tool in intraregional (or even
interregional) economic development competition, the benefit-cost equation
starts to take on negative connotations. In the case of a short-distance
relocation of a firm from community A to community B, the region will
experience little if any gain in economic development benefits from the
firm's local presence. 30 However, in general, if TIF financing is used for
the firm at its new location in community B the region is bearing public
sector costs that would not have been present if the firm had retained its
original location. Although for commercial firms the move from community
A to community B may be a fiscal winner for municipality B (especially
with TIF financing), the larger community (and commercial market area)
loses out by paying a subsidy to a firm that would otherwise have been
serving the region and employing the same workforce.
Unfortunately, the misuse of TIF in border wars and the view of TIF
as a general purpose economic development tool is further perpetuated by
the advice given communities by corporate site selection people and local
economic development officials. Communities have been advised by firms

30. A notable exception to this point is when there is insufficient expansion capacity
at original site A. In this case the incremental (and only the incremental) benefits of the
expansion of the firm through a relocation to community B can be counted as a net gain to
the region or area.
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looking for a site that the firm will look much more favorably at the
community if the community will declare their site of preference a TIF
district. Local economic development officials in northern Illinois have also
counseled small towns that their competitive advantage with their neighbors
is greatly driven by their declaring a TIF district. This is as clear an
example of the cart driving the horse as I have seen in a long time, and it
is counter to the intended use of TIF. Even some proponents of TIFs
acknowledge the problem of developer driven TIFs in terms of perverting
the intended policy process.
V.

TI IN ILLINOIS: How WE CAN MAKE IT BETTER

TIF in Illinois has its problems, but it is by no means fatally ill. While
there are perhaps hundreds of ways of implementing TIF and even dozens
of ways of implementing TIF effectively, I want to highlight a few ways
that the TIF law or its administration in Illinois could be changed for the
better.
Suggestion 1: Offer two statutorypathsfor TIF designation:one for
blighted areas,one not requiringa blighting declaration.
This suggestion would address many, if not most, of the concerns
expressed regarding the TIF experience in Illinois. For blighted areas, the
conceptual construct of the current statute would be followed. However, the
declaration of blight and the meeting of a "but for" test with a time horizon
equal to the life of the proposed TIF would have to be met and independently certified. In addition, taxing districts representing a majority of the tax
extensions in the proposed district would be required to concur in the blight
finding. In the absence of such concurrence, an appeal structure administered by the state would settle the disagreement in the form of binding
arbitration. Regional TIF appeal panels in several of the more highly
populated areas of the state would probably be the best means of addressing
this issue, and these appeal panels should be outside of the judicial system.
The important feature that makes this system an improvement on the current
system is that the presumption is against the TIF. Indeed, the appeal
process should be set up to ensure that the burden of proof in the process
remains with the municipality seeking the TIF. If a proposed TIF district
truly is a blighted area, the incentives for the constituent non-municipal units
will be to approve the TIF.
Universally allowing declaration of TIF districts without a blight
finding would be a unique addition to the Illinois TIF experience. The idea
here would be that an area could be declared a TIF district without a finding
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of blight, upon the concurrence of taxing districts (including the municipality) representing a supermajority (80%?) of the tax extensions in the
proposed district. This would allow TIF to be used as a general purpose
economic development tool, but only upon the concurrence of a broad crosssection of the community as represented through the interests of a range of
special purpose governments.
Another means of regulating the declaration of TIEF districts would be
to allow placement of the TIF district designation on the ballot as a binding
referendum question upon receipt of a petition signed by a minimum of 10%
of the registered voters in the smallest geographic area represented by
jurisdictions extending a supermajority of the property taxes (again say
80%) in. the TIF district.31 Such a referendum would likely doom most
TIF proposals to failure, but the prospects of such doom could perhaps be
reduced by increasing the signature requirement, reducing the geographic
area over which the referendum is voted (e.g., reducing the referendum to
the municipal level with a consequent requirement of a supermajority for
passage), or requiring a supermajority against the TIF in order to invalidate
or stop its declaration. When your author first proposed a derivative of this
idea at a midwest symposium of economic development, the response was
significantly more favorable than one would expect, although the idea was
presented in the context of large economic development projects rather than
merely TIFs.
Suggestion 2: ProhibitTFfrom being usedfor greenfielddevelopment.
TIEF works far better from an efficiency standpoint as a redevelopment
tool. In cases of redevelopment, TIF funds are used to make the given site
as attractive or more attractive than a comparable greenfield site. Such use
of TIF encourages in-fill development, helps retain the financial viability for
investment in downtown or other central areas that have lost their competitive edge to fringe area development, and such projects are much more
likely to meet the "but for" standard.
Even in the case of authorized non-blight area TIFs, prohibiting the use
of TIEF for greenfidld development would encourage exploration of
alternative, more innovative economic development tools. Such tools could
31. The reason for this convoluted structure can easily be seen when one considers

tasing entities like the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District in the Chicago area. If we
merely took the geographic boundaries represented by all districts extending taxes in the TIF
district, the geographic boundaries of the referendum would be extremely wide and would

not be indicative of the appropriate unit of influence (positive or negative) for most, if not
all, TIF districts.
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include tax rebates, marketing and planning assistance, infrastructure
buyback arrangements, and others that involve a division of risk and reward
between the public and private sector in some form of partnership agreement.
Suggestion 3: In the case of TIF usedfor retaildevelopment (or other
uses creating sales tax revenues), require municipal revenue sharing of
revenuesfrom the development for the life of the project.
A pet peeve that I have with TIF can be explained in the following
fashion. A home-rule municipality who levies no real property tax can have
a TIF by contributing an annual amount equivalent to 10% of the tax
increment pool for the year. This means that the municipality can leverage
its investment in TIF financed project at a rate of 9 to 1. The catch is that
the municipality can then capture 100% of the municipal (and home-rule if
applicable) sales tax revenue from the development. Thus, the municipality
can use the TIF to create sales tax revenue for itself that is in effect
financed (in excess of the 10% contribution which could come out of the
sales tax revenues!) wholly for the length of the TIF by other local
governments. Therefore, as a further incentive to explore alternatives to TIF
and the use of TIF as a last resort financing tool, the municipality must
participate in a sales revenue sharing agreement with the remaining local
governments that will allow revenue sharing up to the property tax
increment contributed by each local government.
Suggestion 4: Once a firm receives TIF assistancein a given market
area, it is ineligibleto participatein any other TIFfinanced redevelopment
plan within the same market areafor a period not less than 20 years.
Redfield points out a case of abuse that helps to drive suggesting this
regulation. 32 A grocery store was located in a community with the
assistance of TIF in 1983. 33 In 1994, an adjacent community formed a
TIF to form a shopping district to be anchored by moving the grocery store
across municipal boundaries to anchor the new development.3 4 The above
suggested regulation would remove this particular manifestation of the ugly
nature of TIF.35 Tightening up on the use of TIF for any type of reloca32. Redfield, supra n.2.

33. Id.

34. Id.
35. The notion of a firm would have to be clearly and broadly defined to avoid the

loophole (or evasion device if you prefer) present in the current TIF law.
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tion would also go a long way to relieving the zero-sum or negative-sum use
of TIF to merely alter the location of existing economic activity.
Suggestion 5: As a generalrule, TIF should not be usedfor residential
redevelopment.
In general, most forms of residential development represent a fiscal loss
for school districts in terms of their operating expenditures. Thus, the
premise of TIF, utilizing the tax increment in the short-term for gains to all
government units in the long-term, is inherently violated through the use of
TIF funds for residential development.
CONCLUSIONS
TIF in Illinois has its problems, but most of those problems lie not in
our statutes but rather in the administration and interpretation of those
statutes. There is much good to be said about TIF as a special-purpose
economic development tool. There is much bad to be said about TIF as a
general-purpose economic development tool. There is much ugly to be said
about TIF as a tool in economic development wars between jurisdictions.
The suggestions made in this paper are relatively simple, in some cases
radical, and in all cases from the heart. As a public finance economist
specializing in local economic development policy I believe in the use of
TIEF as a local economic development tool, but would rather see it eliminated rather than see the perversion of the Illinois experience.

